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 Looking ahead: Anticipatory cueing of attention to objects others will look at 
 
 
Seeing a face gaze at an object elicits rapid attention shifts toward the same object. We tested whether 
gaze cueing is predictive: do people shift their attention toward objects others are merely expected to 
look at? Participants categorized objects while a face either looked at this object, at another object, or 
straight ahead. Unbeknownst to participants, one face would only look at drinks and the other at foods. 
We tested ǁhetheƌ atteŶtioŶ ǁas dƌaǁŶ toǁaƌd oďjeĐts ͞faǀoƌed͟ ďǇ a faĐe eǀeŶ ǁheŶ ĐuƌƌeŶtlǇ 
looking straight ahead. Indeed, while gaze expectations initially had a disruptive effect, participants did 
shift atteŶtioŶ to the faĐes’ faǀoƌed oďjeĐts oŶĐe leaƌŶiŶg had ďeeŶ estaďlished, as loŶg as eŵotioŶal 
expressions had indicated personal relevance of the object to the individual. These data support 
predictive models of social perception, which assume that predictions can drive perception and action, 
as if these stimuli were directly perceived. 
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Humans routinely track what other people know, want, and feel, for a large number of individuals, 
without being explicitly aware of it (e.g., Schneider, Bayliss, Becker, & Dux, 2012). A key process in this 
aďilitǇ is the huŵaŶ teŶdeŶĐǇ to folloǁ otheƌs’ gaze. “eeiŶg a faĐe look at aŶ oďjeĐt Đauses a rapid, 
spontaneous shift of spatial attention in the observer toward the same target (Driver et al., 1999; see 
Frischen, Bayliss, & Tipper, 2007; for review). By synchronizing attention across interaction partners, 
this ͞gaze ĐueiŶg͟ effeĐt ŵaǇ uŶdeƌpiŶ, at least iŶ paƌt, ŵaŶkiŶd’s ƌeŵaƌkaďle aďilitǇ foƌ soĐial leaƌŶiŶg, 
cooperation, and communication. Conversely, disruptions of this process may underlie some of the 
soĐial difﬁĐulties iŶ autisŵ spectrum and related conditions (Baron-Cohen et al., 1995). 
The present study tests whether gaze cueing is predictive. Do we just follow the overt gaze of other 
people, or do we also routinely shift our attention toward what we expect other people will look at? 
EǀeƌǇdaǇ ďehaǀioƌ is ƌipe ǁith suĐh aŶtiĐipatoƌǇ atteŶtioŶ shifts, ǁheƌe people’s atteŶtioŶ is guided ďǇ 
the relevance an object has, not to themselves, but to their interaction partners. Parents report that 
their attention is often drawn to objects (diggers, tractors, princesses, and sweets) that their children 
would like. People helpfully point out objects others are looking for, and, when shopping, they have a 
kŶaĐk of ﬁŶdiŶg iteŵs that theiƌ fƌieŶds ǁould like. 
Such predictive gaze-cueing effects emerge naturally from recent hierarchical feedback models of 
perception (Clark, 2013; Friston & Kiebel, 2009; Kilner, Friston, & Frith, 2007). In such models, 
perception is not only driven by bottom-up sensory information, but is directly informed by prior 
knowledge   about   forthcoming   events.   In   many Đases, these pƌediĐtioŶs ĐaŶ ͞staŶd iŶ͟ foƌ ǁhat is 
actually observed, and induce perceptual biases. For example, people misperceive the disappearance 
point of a moving object further along the trajectory than it really is (Freyd & Finke, 1984). These 
pƌediĐtioŶs of futuƌe ŵotioŶ aƌe guided ďǇ oŶe’s assuŵptions about the external forces acting on the 
object (cf. Hubbard, 2005) and are integrated, in a Bayesian manner, with actual stimulation (e.g., 
Roach, McGraw, & Johnston, 2011). In the social domain, it has been shown that heads appear to be 
rotated further if their gaze suggests a looking goal in this direction (Hudson, Hong-Liu, & Jellema, 
2009). Hands are perceived closer to an object when the observer anticipates a reach and further away 
if they anticipate a withdrawal (Hudson, Nicholson, Ellis, & Bach, under review-a, under review-b), and 
observers more speedily identify actions an individual typically carries out with an object, compared to 
actions that are equally likely but typical for someone else (Schenke, Wyer, & Bach, under review). 
These   ﬁŶdiŶgs   pƌoǀide   iŶitial   eǀideŶĐe   that people ĐoŶstaŶtlǇ pƌediĐt otheƌs’ future  behavior and 
that these predictions can, to some extent, stand in for sensory information, as if these stimuli were 
diƌeĐtlǇ peƌĐeiǀed. Heƌe, ǁe test, foƌ the ﬁƌst tiŵe, ǁhetheƌ oďseƌǀeƌs ŵake suĐh pƌediĐtioŶs aďout 
otheƌs’ gaze, aŶd ǁhetheƌ these gaze predictions lead to similar attentional shifts as directly perceived 
gaze. Prior research has provided suggestive evidence for this idea. For example, gaze cueing can be 
elicited not only by directly perceived gaze but merely by the belief that a person looks at an object 
(Teufel, Alexis, Clayton, & Davis, 2010). Moreover, Frischen and Tipper (2006) have reported that, when 
 re-encountering a face one has seen before, attention is guided not oŶlǇ ďǇ the faĐe’s ĐuƌƌeŶt gaze, ďut 
ďǇ its gaze iŶ the pƌeǀious eŶĐouŶteƌ. FƌisĐheŶ aŶd Tippeƌ iŶteƌpƌeted this as a ƌeĐall of the oďseƌǀeƌ’s  
oǁŶ pƌioƌ atteŶtioŶal state, ďut it ŵight also ƌeﬂeĐt aŶ aŶtiĐipatoƌǇ ĐodiŶg of gaze ;Đf. BaǇliss & Tippeƌ, 
2006). The person in the photograph had been looking left so we predict the photograph to show the 
same gaze when seen again. 
To test whether gaze expectations can induce such anticipatory gaze cueing, we adapted the standard 
gaze-cueing paradigm. In each trial, participants saw one  of  two  faces  in  the  middle of two objects. A 
target appeared on one of the objects and participants indicated, in a speeded response, whether the 
object was a food or a drink. In half the trials, the face would gaze—and smile—at one of the two 
objects just prior to the cue. Participants were instructed to ignore these gaze shifts, and we 
manipulated, unbeknownst to participants, which objects the two faces would look at.  One face would 
only look and smile at drinks, and the other at foods. According to prior work, these gaze shifts should 
involuntarily direct attention to the gazed-at object, rendering it easier to identify. 
The key question is whether people form gaze expectations about the two individuals, such that 
attention would shift toward their favored object, even when the individuals looked straight ahead. 
Participants should then more quickly identify objects the face would typically gaze at, compared with 
objects it typically looks aǁaǇ fƌoŵ, speĐiﬁĐallǇ iŶ the seĐoŶd half of the eǆpeƌiŵeŶt, ǁheŶ paƌtiĐipaŶts 
have learned the relationships between faces and objects. Such an effect could not be explained by a 
mere reactivation of the oďseƌǀeƌ’s prior attentional state. Overall, both faces equally often looked left 
and right, and their favored objects were seen equally often in both locations. Finding gaze- cueing 
effeĐts toǁaƌd the faĐes’ faǀoƌed oďjeĐts ǁould theƌefoƌe ƌeǀeal aŶ aŶtiĐipatoƌǇ ĐueiŶg of atteŶtioŶ 
guided by predictioŶs aďout the otheƌ iŶdiǀiduals’ ďehaǀioƌ. 
 
 
METHOD 
 
Participants 
 
Sixty-two students from Plymouth University (18–52 years, 14 male) took part. Sample size was 
determined by a power analysis conducted on pilot data (see Supplementary material). For half of the 
participants the presented faces were cartoon faces and for the other half the presented faces were 
real face photographs.  Cartoon faces are typically more effective in evoking gaze shifts, most likely 
because their visual simplicity facilitates cue extraction (e.g., Hietanen & Leppänen, 2003) and are 
therefore the most powerful test of the experimental hypothesis. Face photographs, in contrast, allow 
us to test whether any effects generalize to more realistic face representations that more plausibly 
represent different individuals. Two participants, one from each group, were excluded because they 
made more than 10% errors.  The study was approved by the ethics committee of Plymouth University, 
and adhered to the ethical guidelines of the ESRC, in accord with the declaration of Helsinki. 
 
Material and apparatus 
 
All participants completed the Autism Quotient (AQ; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & 
Clubley, 2001). The experiment proper was administered via Presentation software, on a Windows XP 
SP3 1280 × 1024 32-ďit Đoloƌ ϭϳ͟ displaǇ. “tiŵuli ǁeƌe asseŵďled fƌoŵ Ϯϱ iŵages: a ﬁǆatioŶ Đƌoss ;the 
͞+͟ sǇŵďol iŶ MiĐƌosoft’s TƌeďuĐhet foŶtͿ, fouƌ Đoloƌ photogƌaphs eaĐh of foods (orange, cupcake, 
apple, and hotdog) and drinks (cola can, orange juice, milkshake, and coffee) and cartoon and 
photograph versions of a male and a female face. The cartoon faces were generated with MS 
PowerPoint and the face photographs were taken from the Radboud Face Database (Langner, Dotsch, 
Bijlstra, Wigboldus, Hawk, & Van Knippenberg, 2010). The faces could either look straight ahead with a 
neutral expression, blink (eyes closed) with a neutral expression, or smile while looking left or right 
(Figure 1). 
 
 Design and procedure 
 
The paƌtiĐipaŶts ǁeƌe seated ƌoughlǇ ϲϬ Đŵ aǁaǇ fƌoŵ the ŵoŶitoƌ. TheǇ ﬁlled out the Autisŵ 
Quotient, were given verbal and on-screen instructions, and then completed 16 practice trials. The 
eǆpeƌiŵeŶt pƌopeƌ ĐoŶsisted of Ϯϱϲ tƌials. PaƌtiĐipaŶts ǁeƌe alloǁed to pƌess ͞p͟ at aŶǇ poiŶt to take a 
break. 
EaĐh tƌial staƌted ǁith a ﬁǆatioŶ Đƌoss ;ϰϬϬ ŵsͿ. Afteƌ a ďƌief ďlaŶk ;ϲϬϬ ŵsͿ, oŶe of tǁo faĐes appeaƌed 
in the middle of the screen, with a food item and a drink on either side (locations counterbalanced 
across trials). The face looked straight ahead with a neutral expression for a random time interval 
between 500 and 1100 ms and then blinked for 100 ms. The next image showed the face with eyes 
open, in 50% of the trials looking straight ahead with a neutral expression, or smiling and looking at one 
of the objects in the other 50% of the trails. One face would always look at the drinks and never at 
foods, while the other face showed the opposite behavior (counterbalanced between participants). 
After 400 ms, a blue square appeared on one object and participants categorized this object as either a 
dƌiŶk oƌ a food ďǇ pƌessiŶg eitheƌ ͞h͟ oƌ the spaĐe ďaƌ. This iŵage ǁas pƌesented until participants 
made a response or a maximum trial time of four seconds had passed. Feedback was given for error and 
timeouts reminding participants of the key assignment. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Schematic of the trial sequence. After a ﬁǆatioŶ Đƌoss ;ϰϬϬ ŵsͿ aŶd a ďlaŶk sĐƌeeŶ ;ϲϬϬ ŵsͿ, 
paƌtiĐipaŶts saǁ eitheƌ a ŵale oƌ feŵale faĐe ﬂaŶked ďǇ a dƌiŶk aŶd a food iteŵ. Afteƌ a ƌaŶdoŵ tiŵe 
 interval (between 500 and 1100 ms), the face blinked (for 100 ms). When the eyes opened again, the 
face either looked straight ahead (not shown) or at one of the two objects, and a blue square marking 
the object to be categorized appeared 400 ms later. We manipulated the gaze behavior of the two faces 
such that, if looking sideways, one face would only look at drinks and the other only at food 
(counterbalanced between participants). 
 
 
After the experiment, participants were asked whether they noticed a pattern in the stimuli; none did, 
and several expressed surprise when the manipulation was revealed. 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
As during piloting (Supplementary material), trials (1.7% in total) were excluded if they contained: 
responses before or after the response interval, responses with uncertain presentation  timing  (> 10 
ms), or responses with RTs (response times) ±3 staŶdaƌd deǀiatioŶs fƌoŵ the paƌtiĐipaŶt’s ŵeaŶ iŶ the 
straight or sideways gaze trials. As participants initiated pauses themselves, trials following or preceding 
pauses were also excluded. Participants with AQ scores in the clinical range (> 32) would have been 
excluded, though none were excluded. 
Data were analyzed separately for the gaze-toward object and gaze-straight trials. The gaze trials tested 
whether our paradigm evoked the expected gaze- cueing effects, but do not say anything about gaze 
expectancies, as the faces looked at their favored object in all of these trials. In contrast, the trials with 
straight gaze measured gaze expectancies, and whether attention was directed toward the favored 
object even when the face looked straight ahead. 
 
 
Regular gaze cueing 
 
We ﬁƌst ĐoŶﬁƌŵed that our paradigm elicited the typical gaze-cueing effects. We analyzed the gaze- 
toward object trials with a 2 X 2 mixed-factors ANOVA with Object (looked at, not looked at) and Block 
(1, 2) as repeated measures factors and Group (cartoon faces, photographs) as the between-subjects 
factor. The analysis of RTs (Table 1) only revealed a main effect of Object F(1, 58) = 90.8, MSE = 1563; p 
< .ϬϬϭ, ηpϮ = Ϭ.ϲϭϬ, ďut Ŷo otheƌ effeĐts ;Fs < ϭͿ. PaƌtiĐipaŶts ŵoƌe ƋuiĐklǇ Đategoƌized a looked-at 
object than a not looked-at object, in both Block 1, 
 
TABLE 1 
Regular gaze-cueing effects for both response times and error rates. Values in brackets show the 
standard deviation in the condition 
  
 
 
 
F;ϭ, ϱϴͿ = ϱϰ.ϳ; M“E = ϭϮϰϴ; p < Ϭ.ϬϬϭ, ηpϮ = Ϭ.ϰϴϲͿ and Block 2, F(1, 58) = 58.6; MSE = 1259; p < .001, 
ηpϮ = Ϭ.ϱϬϮͿ. The aŶalogous aŶalǇsis of eƌƌoƌ ƌates ;Table 1) revealed no effects (Fs < 1) except for an 
iŶteƌaĐtioŶ of  OďjeĐt  ďǇ  Gƌoup,  F;ϭ,  ϱϴͿ  =  ϭϯ.ϯ; p < .ϬϬϭ, M“E = Ϭ.Ϭϭϵ; ηpϮ = Ϭ.ϭϵ. Foƌ ĐaƌtooŶ faĐes, 
participants made more errors for not looked- at-objects and for photographs they made more errors 
 for looked-at objects (Table 1). 
 
 
Anticipatory gaze cueing 
 
The crucial test was whether observers would also shift their attention to the expected object when the 
face looked straight ahead. RTs and Error rates in the straight-gaze trials were analyzed with the same 
ANOVA as the regular-gaze trials, with the Object factor now coding whether the target appeared on 
the object the face typically looked at, or the other object. 
The analysis of RTs (Figure 2, left panels) revealed neither an effect of Object, F < 1, nor of Block, F 
(1, 58) = 3.5, MSE = 2052, p = .066, ηp 2 = 0.057, but a significant interaction between both factors, F 
(1, 58) = 12.116, MSE = 761, p = .001, ηp 2 = 0.173. Step down ANOVAs revealed that, in Block 1, 
participants were faster to categorize typically looked away from objects compared to typically 
looked-at objects, F(1, 58) = 6.2, MSE = 822, p = .015, ηp 2 = 0.097, while Block 2 revealed the 
expected pattern of faster responses for objects the person typically looks at, F(1, 58) = 4.9, MSE = 834, 
p = .031, ηp 2 = 0.078. Group did not interact with any factor (Fs < 1). The Object by Block interaction 
was replicated in the photograph group, F(1, 29) = 4.6, MSE = 874, p = .040, ηp 2 = 0.138, and the 
cartoon group F(1, 29) = 8.0, MSE = 647, p = .008, ηp 2 = 0.217, when analyzed separately (Figure 2). 
The analysis of error rates (Figure 2, right panels) revealed a significant effect of Block F(1, 58) = 6.7, 
MSE = 0.001, p = .012, ηp 2 = 0.104, with fewer errors in the second half of the experiment. 
Importantly, there was a significant effect of Object, F (1, 58) = 4.7, MSE = 0.001, p = .034, ηp 2 = 0.075, 
but no interaction, F < 1. Step-down ANOVAs revealed that participants made fewer errors for typically 
gazed-at objects in Block 2, F (1, 58) = 4.863, MSE = 0.001, p = .031, ηp 2 = 0.077, but not in Block 1, F(1, 
58) = 1.065, MSE = 0.001, p = .306, ηp 2 = 0.18. Group did not interact with any other factor (Fs < 2.7). 
A separate study (see Supplementary material) tested whether the same effects were also obtained 
when the observed faces did not smile but showed a neutral expression when looking at the objects, 
  
 
 
 
Figure 2. Response times (left panels) and error rates (right panels) in the straight-gaze trials, for the 
ĐaƌtooŶ faĐes ;top ƌoǁͿ aŶd ƌeal faĐes ;ďottoŵ ƌoǁsͿ gƌoups sepaƌatelǇ. IŶ eaĐh ﬁguƌe, the left tǁo ďaƌs 
shoǁ the data foƌ the ﬁƌst half of the eǆpeƌiŵeŶt, and the right two bars show the data for the second 
half of the experiment. The black bars show categorization response for objects that are typically 
looked at by the shown individual, and the white bars show objects that this individual typically looks 
away form. Error bars show the standard error of the mean. 
 
   
but was otherwise identical. While this study replicated  the regular gaze-cueing effects, with faster 
responses for looked-at compared to not looked-at objects, all predictive gaze-cueing effects in both 
RTs and Error Rates were eliminated, all Fs < 1.1. Indeed, across- experiment comparisons revealed that 
the predictive gaze-ĐueiŶg effeĐts iŶ the ŵaiŶ eǆpeƌiŵeŶt diffeƌed sigŶiﬁĐaŶtlǇ fƌoŵ this control 
experiment, both for the RT interaction, F(1, 118) = 10.5, MSE = 722, p < .002, ηp 2 = 0.082, and the 
error rate effect in Block 2, F (1, 118) = 4.150, MSE = 0.004, p < .044, ηp 2 = 0.034. 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
We tested whether gaze cueing of attention is driven only by bottom-up gaze cues, or whether it is 
predictive, and is guided by the gaze a person is only expected to show. Participants categorized objects 
while a face either looked at this object, at another object, or straight ahead. Unbeknownst to 
participants, we manipulated the looking behavior of the faces, such that one face (e.g., the male) 
would only look at foods and the other (e.g., the female) would only look at drinks. We tested whether 
participants would derive implicit gaze expectations from these contingencies, and whether these 
expectations would elicit similar shifts of attention even when the faces looked straight ahead 
As pƌediĐted, the seĐoŶd half of the eǆpeƌiŵeŶt, afteƌ paƌtiĐipaŶts had leaƌŶed the iŶdiǀiduals’ lookiŶg 
behaviors, revealed such anticipatory cueing effects. Participants categorized objects more quickly and 
reliably if these objects were typically looked and smiled at by the individual, compared to the objects 
that they typically looked away from. These anticipatory shifts of attention were observed even though 
(1) neither the face nor gaze direction was task relevant; (2) gaze direction did not predict the location 
of the task-relevant object; and (3) across faces, allobserved. Gaze cueing of attention is therefore not 
only driven by bottom-up seŶsoƌǇ iŶfoƌŵatioŶ, ďut also ďǇ eǆpeĐtatioŶs aďout otheƌs’ gaze, suppoƌtiŶg 
the assumption that predicted stimulation can drive action and cognition, as if the event was directly 
observed (cf. Clark, 2013; Friston & Kiebel, 2009). 
We had expected that these effects would slowly build up, and that anticipatory gaze cueing was small 
oƌ aďseŶt iŶ the ﬁƌst half of the experiment. However, an unexpected pattern emerged in these earlier 
trials. Participants were slower to identify objects that the other person typically looked at, compared 
to objects they typically looked away from. The shift from negative to positive gaze-cueing effects over 
the experiment was replicated in both the face photograph and cartoon faces groups. It suggests that 
participants learn about the predictive relationships between individuals, objects, and gaze very quickly. 
At the start, these predictions have a disruptive effect. Only when fully established do they guide 
attention similarly as directly observed gaze. 
Although not predicted, such negative effects are in line with hierarchical feedback models of 
perception. These models conceptualize perception as an integration of sensory information and top-
doǁŶ pƌediĐtioŶs, suĐh that pƌediĐtioŶs ĐaŶ ͞staŶd iŶ͟ foƌ ǁhat ǁas aĐtuallǇ peƌĐeiǀed ;Claƌk, 2013; 
Friston & Kiebel, 2009). These assimilative effects of prior information are, however, typically only 
observed when the stimuli are not directly attended (Kok, Rahnev, Jehee, Lau, & de Lange, 2011). 
Attended stimuli may cause reverse effects and bias perception away from the predictions. Classic 
examples are visual after-images, where observing—or even imagining—a movement to the left causes 
subsequent static images to be perceived as moving subtly to the right (Wade, Thompson, & Morgan, 
2014), and we have observed similar contrastive effects in motor activation when famous athletes were 
seen not performing their typical sports (Bach & Tipper, 2006; Tipper & Bach, 2011). In the same way, 
heƌe, the Ŷegatiǀe ĐueiŶg effeĐts ŵight eŵeƌge ďeĐause the iŶdiǀidual’s stƌaight gaze is Đoded ƌelatiǀe 
to the expected looking behavior, causing a bias in the opposite direction. When, however, participants 
become more effective at diverting attention away from the distracting faces over the course of the 
experiment, these effects revert to positive ones, revealing the expected superposition of sensory 
information and prior expectations. Of course, at the moment, these considerations are speculative and 
Ŷeed to ďe fuƌtheƌ ǀeƌiﬁed. 
An interesting observation was that the predictive gaze-cueing effects depended on the faces showing 
aŶ eŵotioŶal ƌespoŶse ǁheŶ lookiŶg at the oďjeĐts ;see also BaǇliss, Gƌifﬁths, & Tippeƌ, 2009; Bayliss, 
Schuch, & Tipper, 2010). In a separate experiment (Supplementary material)—initially used for piloting, 
  
but increased to full sample size at the request of a reviewer—we ran exactly the same procedure, but 
with the faces showing a neutral expression when looking at their objects. While the regular gaze-
cueing effects were identical across experiments, all predictive gaze-cueing effects were now 
eliminated. This difference is striking given that predictive coding models do not necessarily distinguish 
between social and other effects on perception. This dependency on an emotional expression reveals a 
soĐial ĐodiŶg of the iŶdiǀiduals’ gaze, ƌeﬂeĐtiŶg, peƌhaps, the ŵeŶtal states that the eŵotional 
expressions imply, or the emotional relevance the object has to the individuals (cf. Manera, Elena, 
Bayliss, & Becchio, 2014; Bach, Nicholson, & Hudson, 2014). It is in line with the idea that internal 
ŵodels of otheƌ people do Ŷot oŶlǇ ƌeﬂeĐt theiƌ ďehaǀioƌs toǁaƌd oďjeĐts, ďut also the iŶteƌŶal states 
these behaviors imply (Barresi & Moore, 1996Ϳ. Ouƌ Ŷeǁ data theƌefoƌe pƌoǀide the ﬁƌst eǀideŶĐe foƌ 
models suggesting that such top-doǁŶ kŶoǁledge ĐaŶ ďe ĐoŶǀeƌted iŶto ĐoŶĐƌete pƌediĐtioŶs of otheƌs’ 
gaze that dƌiǀes oŶe’s oǁŶ atteŶtioŶ sǇsteŵ as if the gaze shifts ǁeƌe diƌeĐtlǇ oďseƌǀed, as pƌediĐted ďǇ 
predictive coding of social perception (e.g., Kilner, Friston, & Frith, 2007). 
AŶ iŵpoƌtaŶt ƋuestioŶ is ǁhetheƌ the pƌediĐtiǀe effeĐts oŶ gaze ĐueiŶg ƌeﬂeĐt eǆpliĐit oƌ iŵpliĐit 
learning of the contingencies. This question was not central to the current hypotheses, but in a post- 
experiment screening none of the participants reported awareness of the patterns. This unawareness 
probably emerged because the faces of the individuals were task irrelevant and there was no 
relationship between gazed-at-object and object-to-be-categorized. Indeed, many participants stated 
that they attempted to ignore the faces altogether. Moreover, in a prior study, we showed that 
participants often remain unaware of similar relationships between individuals, situations, and 
behaviors (Schenke et al., under review), even when alerted, several times during the experiment, that 
such a pattern was present. Together with the reports of our participants, these data indicate that the 
typical behavior of others is learned in a largely implicit manner, but nevertheless directly affects 
perception and guidance of attention. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Gaze cueing of attention is not only driven by bottom-up sensory information, but also by prior 
expectations about what other individuals will look at in a given situation. Because gaze cueing is 
ĐeŶtƌal foƌ joiŶt atteŶtioŶ, leaƌŶiŶg fƌoŵ otheƌs aŶd ﬂueŶt soĐial iŶteƌaĐtioŶ, suĐh a pƌediĐtiǀe 
mechanism could have far-reaching impacts on social interaction, allowing people to attend to what 
others will look at in the future, or direct their attention to objects that are relevant to their interaction 
partners. Future experiments need to explore the role of the implicit/explicit nature of the predictions, 
and why, in the ﬁƌst half of the eǆpeƌiŵeŶt, pƌedictions can give rise to paradoxical negative gaze-
cueing effects. 
 
 
Supplementary material 
 
“uppleŵeŶtaƌǇ ;Figuƌe/Taďle/ĐoŶteŶtͿ is aǀailaďle ǀia the ͞“uppleŵeŶtaƌǇ͟ taď oŶ the aƌtiĐle’s oŶliŶe 
page (http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17588928.2015.1053443) For access to data and stimuli, please 
contact the corresponding author, patric.bach@plymouth.ac.uk 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Bach, P., & Tipper, S. P. (2006). Bend it like Beckham: Embodying the motor skills of famous athletes. 
The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 59(12), 2033–2039.    
doi:10.1080/17470210600917801 
Bach, P., Nicholson, T., & Hudson, M. (2014). The affordance-matching hypothesis: how objects guide 
action understanding and prediction. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 8. 
 doi:10.3389/fnhum.2014.00254 
Baron-Cohen, S., Campbell, R., Karmiloff-Smith, A., Grant, J., & Walker, J. (1995). Are children with 
autisŵ ďliŶd to the ŵeŶtalistiĐ sigŶiﬁĐaŶĐe of the eǇes? Bƌitish JouƌŶal of Developmental Psychology, 
13(4), 379–398. doi:10.1111/bjdp.1995.13.issue-4 
Baron-Cohen, S., Wheelwright, S., Skinner, R., Martin, J., &  Clubley,  E.  (2001).  The  autism-spectrum  
quotient (AQ): Evidence from Asperger syndrome/high- functioning autism males and females, 
scientists and mathematicians. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 31(1), 5–17. 
doi:10.1023/A:1005653411471 
Barresi, J., & Moore, C. (1996). Intentional relations and social understanding. Behavioral and Brain 
Sciences, 19, 107–154. 
Bayliss,  A.  P.,  Gƌifﬁths,  D.,  &  Tippeƌ,  “.  P.  ;ϮϬϬϵͿ. Predictive gaze cues affect face evaluations: The 
effect of  facial   emotion.   European  Journal  of  Cognitive Psychology,       21(7),        1072–1084.       
doi:10.1080/09541440802553490 
Bayliss, A. P., Schuch, S. E., & Tipper, S. P. (2010). Gaze cueing elicited  by  emotional  faces  is  
iŶﬂueŶĐed  ďǇ affective context.  Visual Cognition,  18(8),  1214–1232. 
doi:10.1080/13506285.2010.484657 
Bayliss, A. P., & Tipper, S. P. (2006). Gaze cues evoke both spatial and object-centered shifts of 
attention. Perception &   Psychophysics,   68(2),   310–318.   doi:10.3758/BF03193678 
Clark, A. (2013). Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of cognitive science. 
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 36, 1–73. doi:10.1017/S0140525X12000477 
Driver, J., Davis, G., Ricciardelli, P., Kidd, P., Maxwell, E., &  Baron-Cohen,  S.  (1999).  Gaze  perception  
tƌiggeƌs ƌeﬂeǆiǀe ǀisuospatial oƌieŶtiŶg. Visual CogŶitioŶ,  ϲ;ϱͿ, 509–540.  
doi:10.1080/135062899394920 
Freyd,   J.   J.,   &   Finke,   R.   A.   (1984).   Representational momentum.   Journal   of   Experimental   
Psychology: Learning Memory and Cognition, 10, 126–132. 
Frischen, A., Bayliss, A. P., & Tipper, S. P. (2007). Gaze cueing of attention: Visual attention, social 
cognition, and individual differences. Psychological Bulletin, 133 (4), 694–724. doi:10.1037/0033-
2909.133.4.694 
Frischen, A., & Tipper, S. P. (2006). Long-term gaze cueing effects: Evidence for retrieval of prior states 
of attention from   memory.   Visual   Cognition,   14(3),   351–364. doi:10.1080/13506280544000192 
Friston,  K.  J.,  &  Kiebel,  S.  (2009).  Cortical  circuits  for perceptual inference. Neural Networks, 22, 
1093–1104. doi:10.1016/j.neunet.2009.07.023 
Hietanen, J. K., & Leppänen, J. M. (2003). Does facial expression affect attention orienting by gaze 
direction cues?   Journal  of  Experimental  Psychology:  Human Perception and Performance, 29(6), 
1228. 
Hubbard, T. L. (2005). Representational momentum and related displacements in spatial memory: A 
review of the ﬁŶdiŶgs. PsǇĐhoŶoŵiĐ BulletiŶ & Reǀiew, 12, 822–851. doi:10.3758/BF03196775 
Hudson,   M.,   Hong-Liu,   C.,   &   Jellema,   T.   (2009). Anticipating intentional actions: The effect of eye 
gaze direction on the judgment of head rotation. Cognition, 112,  423–434.  
doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2009.06.011 
Hudson, M., Nicholson, T., Ellis, R., & Bach, P. (under review-a). I see what you say: Prior knowledge of 
otheƌ’s goals automatically biases the perception of their actions. 
Hudson, M., Nicholson, T., Ellis, R., & Bach, P. (under review-b). One step ahead: the perceived 
kinematics of otheƌs’ aĐtioŶs aƌe ďiased toǁaƌds eǆpeĐted goals.  
Kilner,  J.  M.,  Friston,  K.  J.,  &  Frith,  C.  D.  (2007). 
Predictive  coding:  An  account  of  the  mirror  neuron system. Cognitive Processing,8, 159–166. 
doi:10.1007/s10339-007-0170-2 
Kok, P., Rahnev, D., Jehee, J. F., Lau, H. C., & de Lange, F. P. (2011). Attention reverses the effect of 
prediction in silencing  sensory  signals.  Cerebral Cortex,  bhr310. 
Cerebral Cortex, 22(9), 2197–2206. Langner, O., Dotsch, R., Bijlstra, G., Wigboldus, D. H., Hawk,   S.   T.,   
&   Van   Knippenberg,   A.   (2010). 
Presentation  and  validation  of  the  Radboud  Faces Database.  Cognition and Emotion,  24(8),  1377–
  
1388. doi:10.1080/02699930903485076 
Manera, V., Elena, M. R., Bayliss, A. P., & Becchio, C. (2014). When seeing is more than looking: 
Intentional gaze modulates object desirability. Emotion, 14(4), 824– 832. doi:10.1037/a0036258 
Roach,  N.  W.,  McGraw,  P.  V.,  &  Johnston,  A.  (2011). 
Visual motion induces a forward prediction of spatial pattern. Current Biology, 21(9), 740–745. 
doi:10.1016/j. cub.2011.03.031 
Schenke, K., Wyer, N., & Bach, P. (under review). The things  you  do:  implicit  person  models  guide  
online action observation. 
Schneider, D., Bayliss, A. P., Becker, S. I., & Dux, P. E. (2012).   Eye   movements   reveal   sustained   
implicit  
pƌoĐessiŶg of otheƌs’ ŵeŶtal states. JouƌŶal of EǆpeƌiŵeŶtal PsǇĐhologǇ: GeŶeƌal, ϭϰϭ;ϯͿ, ϰϯϯ–438. 
doi:10.1037/a0025458 
Teufel, C., Alexis, D. M., Clayton, N. S., & Davis, G. (2010). 
Mental-state attƌiďutioŶ dƌiǀes ƌapid, ƌeﬂeǆiǀe gaze folloǁiŶg. AtteŶtioŶ, PeƌĐeptioŶ, & PsǇĐhophǇsiĐs, 
72(3), 
695–705. doi:10.3758/APP.72.3.695 
Tipper, S. P., & Bach, P. (2011). The face inhibition effect: Social contrast or motor competition? Journal 
of Cognitive  Psychology,  23(1),  45–51.  doi:10.1080/20445911.2011.451888 
Wade, N. J., Thompson, P., & Morgan, M. (2014). The after-effeĐt   of   Adolf   Wohlgeŵuth’s   seeŶ   
motion. 
Perception, 43, 229–234. doi:10.1068/p4304ed 
